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ABSTRACT: Climate change is quickly becoming one of the biggest threats faced by the 
international community and has the capacity to greatly impact global security. The relationship 
between climate change and conflict is still unraveling; however, worsening climatic events have 
contributed to political instability around the world. As climate change implications become more 
apparent, water is less abundant due to worsening droughts and less precipitation, allowing it to 
become a target for groups seeking to control territory or populations. This paper examines the 
impact of climate change in shifting the power dynamic between states and violent non-state actors 
within their borders. More specifically, focusing on the use of water weaponization by the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The water weaponization of ISIL in Iraq and Syria shows the 
ability of water resources to be manipulated in a water scarce and politically unstable environment 
to strengthen the role of violent non-state actors. This research creates a chronology of water 
weaponization to track acts of water weaponization by ISIL from 2012, as they gained power in 
Iraq and Syria, until 2019 following the ‘defeat’ of their caliphate. Succeeding the chronology, acts 
of water weaponization are tracked using the Institute for the Study of War’s ISIS Sanctuary maps 
and Situation Reports to find the connection between acts of water weaponization and the strength 
of their caliphate through territory held. Through identifying fourteen water weaponization acts by 
ISIL from 2012-2019, a connection is found between the acquisition of a water resource, or an 
attack weaponizing water, and the territorial shifts of the caliphate over time. In doing so, this 
research hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between climate change 




As the effects of climate change become more visible, there is intensifying discussion of the nexus 
between climate change and conflict. In 2014, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
dedicated a report, the first of its kind, addressing the human security dimensions of climate 
change.1 Increased droughts in arid and semi-arid regions are one of the most frequent ways in 
which climate change might increase conflict, one of the most affected regions being the Middle 
East.2 The Middle East has experienced ten out of twelve of its’ driest winters since 1902 within 
the last 20 years, with climate change being one of the key factors for this increase in drying.3 In 
relation to this prediction, this research seeks to explore the connection between climate change 
and conflict in the Middle East.  
The drought between 2006 and 2010 in the Levant region was a major factor in the 2011 
uprising in Syria.4 It was estimated that 1.3 million Syrians experienced or were affected by 
agricultural failures due to the drought.5 Wheat and barley prices dropped 47% and 67% 
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respectively and approximately 800,000 inhabitants lost their livelihoods.6 This major agricultural 
failure led to a widespread migration of up to 1.5 million Syrians from rural to urban centers.7 In 
September 2008, the first UN drought appeal claimed that migration from rural areas during 2007 
and 2008 was 20 to 30% higher than during previous years.8 A subsequent UN report estimated 
the drought migration at 65,000 families in that time period, although a UN Special Reporter once 
claimed 600,000 people had emigrated.9 De Châtel (2014) notes that the Northeast region of Syria 
had been declining since 2000 due to the agricultural practice shifts and mismanagement of water 
and land resources; however, continued mishandling of climatic events and a weak socio-political 
atmosphere exacerbated existing instability.  
Water management in Iraq has been poor throughout continued conflicts in the past 
decades. The first and second Gulf wars led to a major breakdown of an already crumbling water 
management system.10 The 2006-2010 drought interacted with the poor socio-economic system 
following the geopolitical upheavals in Iraq following the Gulf wars and the 2003 US invasion and 
continued insurgency.11 Namely, the drought intensified grievances and stress on the Iraqi society 
through the effects of migration and agricultural losses (King, 2015). Between 2008 and 2009, 
Iraqi crop yields plummeted 45% leading to a sharp increase in food prices and food insecurity.12 
This event led to over 10,000 farmers abandoning their fields along the Euphrates to emigrate to 
already struggling urban centers, which increased tensions with the Iraqi government who failed 
to provide adequate services.13 These conditions allowed the Syrian conflict to spill across the 
border into North-Western Iraq.14  
In areas where climate disasters weakened central government authority, new areas opened 
that not only provided a safe haven to violent non-state terror actors, but also served as an incubator 
where these groups could increase their numbers and gain momentum.15 The Northern provinces 
of Syria, which produced two-thirds of Syria’s crop yields, were some of the most impacted by the 
drought.16 These same regions are the ones that ISIL has maintained steady control of since the 
beginning of the conflict.17 Due to the political instability in Iraq and Syria, exacerbated by the 
drought and weak water management systems, dams overwhelmingly became a focal point of 
struggle, and a weapon in war.18 ISIL captured strategic natural resources and weaponized them 
to accomplish political, economic, and military aims.19 It is these actions that showcase ISIL’s goal 
of establishing a caliphate that intends to assume many of the attributes of statehood, including 
control of territory and providing municipal services to its population. Through apprehending 
water resources or manipulating them to control the local population, ISIL shifts the power 
dynamic away from the established state by decreasing state sovereignty and maintaining control 
over key resources such as food, water, energy and employment. 
This paper first explores the existing literature on the relationship between climate change 
and conflict, water weaponization and the weakening of nation-states. In order to explore the 
connections between these concepts, a water weaponization chronology of fourteen water 
weaponization acts by ISIL is produced, along with subsequent state actions against these acts, 
from November 2012 through June 2018 using information from a variety of news sources, the 
Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site and the Global Terrorism Database. Following the 
chronology, the Institute for the Study of War’s ISIS Sanctuary Maps and Campaign Tracker are 
utilized to map these water weaponization acts coinciding with the caliphate’s territorial activity 
in Iraq and Syria until March 2019 with the announcement of the caliphate’s defeat. The analysis 
of the chronology and territorial shifts shows a connection between the acquisition of water 
resources or manipulation of water with the gaining and loss of territory by ISIL over this time 
period. 
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The weakening of the nation-state as the primary security actor has caused great concern among 
the international community. Recent technological, economic, and social developments have 
posed serious challenges to the capacity of a nation to fulfill their traditional functions of security, 
welfare, and identity, which has allowed for a greater playing field for violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs) including terror organizations.20,21 A report by the US National Intelligence Council 
explains that challenges such as water shortages, poor water quality, and floods increase the risk 
of instability and state failure and elevate interstate tensions.22 
Of increased interest is the degree to which climate change might exacerbate both water 
insecurity and political instability, causing opportunity for these violent non-state actors. Climate 
change is often classified as a ‘threat multiplier’, meaning that it triggers, accelerates and 
intensifies current instabilities.23 Scholarly research has primarily explored the MENA region, 
Africa and Southeast Asia. Climate change has enflamed water stress in these areas due to 
increased droughts, less precipitation and natural disasters combined with weak governments and 
powerful non-state combatants.24 When extreme poverty is exacerbated by climate threats and the 
presence of terrorist organizations, climate change can expand the role and recruiting of these 
organizations.25 Climate change impacts elicit the occupation of vital water infrastructure, or the 
targeting of essential water sources, which make the local population rely on the occupying group 
for vital resources.26 The developed world will be far better prepared to tackle the effects of climate 
change compared to developing nations; therefore, the gap between developed and under-
developed countries can potentially provide an opening for extremist ideologies and create the 
conditions for terrorism.27 In relation to anticipated climate change effects, increased poverty and 
reduced state capacity may contribute to the creation or preservation of functional space which 
may allow terrorist groups to flourish.28 Of this discussion, the most frequently sought connection 
between climate change and terrorism within these regions is through water. 
In order to conceptualize water as a strategic resource utilized by these terror actors, 
scholars studying water in security studies focus on water scarcity combined with other factors as 
a determinant of intra-state conflict.29,30 Violent non-state actors such as terrorist organizations 
pose a significant threat to nation-states as they are engaging states in “asymmetric wars,” in which 
there are no rules to warfare enabling the expansion of tactics used.31 For instance, under the 1977 
Protocols to the Geneva Convention it is prohibited to “attack, destroy or render useless objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population”, including water.32 While states must abide 
by social norms of war including international law, non-state actors do not, which has increased 
the direct targeting of strategic resources, such as water, to achieve their goals.33 
Some classify water weaponization in the concept of “hydro-terrorism.”34 VNSAs 
destabilize governments through violent and coercive acts using resources like water as a target, a 
weapon, a leveraging tool, and a nation-building strategy as well as a motive for violent response.35 
King provides a detailed clarification on types of water weaponization used by these groups. In his 
assessment of water weaponization, King defines strategic, tactical, psychological terrorism, 
extortion or incentivization, and unintentional weaponization.36 He outlines strategic 
weaponization as “the use of water to virtually or actually control large or important land areas or 
facilities to fulfill the vision of sovereignty, and…an asset to fund activities, such as administration 
and weapons acquisition, of a ‘state.’”37 Tactical weaponization is primarily the “use of water as a 
weapon on the battlefield in direct or instant support of military operations or against targets of 
military value.”38 Psychological terrorism encompasses “creating fear among non-combatants or 
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the denial of access or contamination of the water supply.”39 Extortion or incentivization involves 
the “use of the water weapon to establish credibility as a governing authority or to reward support 
from the local population.”40 Lastly, unintentional weaponization describes when the “use of water 
as a weapon causes collateral damage to civilians or the ecological environment.”41 This 
classification is the most detailed of water weaponization and is useful to separate the multiple 
utilizations of this strategy. 
Additional definitions are utilized to encompass the use of water weaponization. Von 
Lossow (2016) describes weaponized water as “water resources directly used as an instrument of 
war in order to achieve strategic political and tactical military goals through targeting the 
population, addressing the opponent’s political leadership and confronting the opposing 
military.”42 Von Lossow’s definition is an all-encompassing definition to describe the strategy 
rather than separate the different types of weaponization and primarily combines King’s tactical 
and strategic water weaponization classifications.43 Daoudy (2020) rather splits it into categories 
including: domination and legitimacy, the control over resources and infrastructures; attack and 
capture of large infrastructures (a military target and goal); cutting off water, intentional flooding 
and defensive fortification (a military tool); and delivery or refusal of basic infrastructure-
produced services (a tool of cooperation). This paper utilizes Daoudy’s (2020) definition as it is 
primarily interested in the ways in which water weaponization is used to shift the power dynamic 
between the nation-state and VNSAs and the four classifications seen in this definition are the 
most aligned with the types of weaponization used by ISIL to accomplish this.  
Water weaponization is also covered in the context of environmental terrorism– distinct 
from ‘hydro-terrorism’. Gleick (2006) defines the term “environmental terrorism” as referring to 
the “unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems with the intent to harm 
individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social 
objective.”44 Although environmental terrorism encompasses any environmental resources, water 
is damaged by rendering water unusable, or destroying purification and supply infrastructure, 
harming local populations.45 For this research, the classification of acts of water weaponization is 
not utilized; however, this discussion is useful to clarify the meaning of the term and how scholars 
have previously identified these acts. 
The degree to which water is able to be weaponized relies on its value to the state, which 
makes regions of the world more prone to water scarcity exacerbated by climate change greater 
targets. Von Lossow (2016) noted that the effect of water as a weapon depends on the regional 
hydrological and political context. A resource is more strategically appealing and destructive based 
on its potential impact in a specific environment.46 Sofuoğlu et al. (2019) show support for a 
general causal pattern between climate change and political instability within 16 countries, and 
conflict in 15 countries, in the Middle East and North Africa region (out of 18 analyzed over the 
time period of 1985-2016). In arid or semiarid regions like the Middle East and North Africa where 
water is already scarce, combatants use water to provide robust leverage over their opposition as 
a militarized target.47 ISIL in Syria and Iraq has employed the most frequent use of water as a 
strategic resource in gaining control of territory.48 ISIL has distinguished itself from other terror 
organizations through its vision of a caliphate that will assume many of the attributes of statehood, 
including territorial dominance and provision of municipal services to its population.49 Water is a 
key component of this strategy through their ability to both maintain control and gain territory, but 
also as a source of taxation, agriculture, and as a service usually provided by a state.50  
Alternative organizations employing these strategies that scholars have explored include 
Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although less 
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central to their strategy, these groups have all used water as a strategic weapon. Succeeding 
widespread regional droughts in 2011, Al Shabaab cut off liberated cities from their water sources, 
forcing residents from cut-off cities to walk to nearby towns to fetch water, many of which Al 
Shabaab controlled.51 Al Shabaab’s water weaponization was widely unsuccessful in its attempt 
to gain legitimacy or hurt the Somali government forces; however, it led to widespread suffering 
in the population and maintained their presence in the region during the ongoing civil war in 
Somalia.52 Boko Haram was documented weaponizing the limited water resources in Nigeria, 
strategically contaminating water sources such as streams and wells pursued by their enemy, 
capitalizing on the unrest caused by the civil war from 2005-2010.53 Continued water stress and 
intensification of both droughts and flooding in the region impeded the governance capacity of the 
weak Nigerian government, which led to Boko Haram’s violent surge to create an Islamic caliphate 
in 2010.54 In 2017, the Taliban blew up a dam constructed in the Kandahar province of 
Afghanistan, a key irrigation resource to agricultural lands and its destruction sparked panic among 
residents.55 Afghanistan is prone to drought and flooding, which have become more severe as 
climate change impacts have progressed, causing less snow, earlier snow melting, and an extended, 
hotter growing season.56 Additionally, the national government of Afghanistan was not functional 
for much of the past few decades meaning a lack of central governance over water infrastructure.57 
These are additional examples in which states with weak central governments have been unable to 
maintain authority to govern due to environmental crises, allowing VNSAs to manipulate water 
resources as weapons.  
As the above examples of countries in the Middle East and African regions imply the 
vulnerability of states to both climate threats and terrorism hinges on their strength as a state. A 
decrease in state authority often correlates with an increase in non-state terror organization 
occurrence who can use strategic resources to their advantage.58 The provision of goods is a key 
measure indicating the difference between a weak state and a strong state. The state’s primary 
function is to provide security meaning to prevent invasions, territorial loss and to eliminate 
domestic threats or assaults on the national order and social norms.59 Unlike strong states, failed 
states cannot maintain their borders and may lose authority over sections of territory.60 Climate 
change has the capacity to contribute to reduced state capacity, state failure and economic troubles 
fostering an enabling environment for non-state actor terrorist groups.61 In the case of interceding 
climatic disasters, the economic failure and pervasive neglect that is endemic to failed states leads 
to recurring food shortages and widespread hunger furthering political instability and providing 
increased access to VNSAs.62 VNSAs capitalize on the destabilization of weak borders and 
reduced state capacity to provide key resources exacerbated by these climatic events. 
The strength of a violent non-state actor is measured similarly to that of states. Oktav 
(2017) uses characterizations of actorness, powerfulness and effectiveness to demonstrate the 
measure. Actorness includes territoriality and geopolitical codes as well as community building, 
specifically highlighting territorial control for administrative practices and enforcing the idea of 
citizenship. Powerfulness comprises financial resources including territorial control and natural 
resources as well as taxes and confiscations, additionally, recruitment and propaganda. Finally, 
effectiveness encompasses regional engagements including regional territorial control and degree 
of security threat as well as international engagements, legitimacy, level of autonomy and 
counterterrorism actions by the international community. Oktav’s study using the Islamic State as 
an example, highlights viewing territory not only as a shelter but also an opportunity to engage in 
administrative aspects of proto-statehood and community-building practices, as well as its funding 
through the extortion of the population within its territories through taxes, fees, and 
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confiscations.63 These distinctions solidify the importance of territory to measure the influence of 
these actors as an indicator of state-like behavior. As discussed previously, water is identified as a 
key component of the ability to both maintain control and gain territory, but also as a source of 
taxation, agriculture, and resources provided by the state.64 
The connection between the identified weakness and failure of states and the advancement 
of violent non-state actors is of vital importance to examine the role of water in these conflicts. 
Through the capitalization of state weakness, substate actors gain control over areas within the 
state, build up their own local security mechanisms, authorized markets, and can even establish 
attempted forms of international relations.65 VNSAs have particular power in contexts where 
governments demonstrate a lack of capacity to provide the goods commonly associated with 
statehood such as security, infrastructure, and other basic welfare services, such as in the Middle 
East and North Africa region suffering from civil wars and continued unrest.66 Organizations can 
leverage their armed capacity to capture and monopolize access to state-sponsored services; 
specifically, previously existing infrastructure, such as dams, to secure locally dominant status at 
the expense of the state while avoiding costly and time-consuming investment in independent 
welfare systems.67 This strategy ensures the dependency of the local population and demonstrates 
that a militia is capable of running the state after the conflict.68  
The existing literature is primarily concerned with the exploration of ISIL’s water strategy 
rather than the tactic’s use in the deterioration of state sovereignty in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, 
while they focus on the beneficial use of the strategy in expanding ISIL’s caliphate, they neglect 
the effect of the loss of these resources and the eventual defeat in March 2019. My research aims 
to link the environmental issues caused by climate change with terrorism by showing how the 
acquisition or manipulation of water resources illustrates the shifting power dynamic between the 
state and VNSAs. In order to show the complete power shift, this paper will analyze not only the 
attainment or manipulation of these resources, but the effects of their retrieval by the state in the 
weakening of the caliphate to provide a full view of the influence of water weaponization to gain 
legitimacy and power. 
 
Research Design 
The unstable conditions produced by the droughts in Iraq and Syria from 2006-2010 played a 
meaningful relationship in the Syrian uprising and the ensuing spill over into Iraq, a weakness 
capitalized upon by ISIL to set up their caliphate.69 Brewing grievances against the failing 
governments and weakened civil institutions produced a safe haven for ISIL combatants and an 
incubator to recruit and gain momentum.70 In Syria, following the loss of livelihood and 
environmental crisis, ISIL recruited 60 to 70% of its fighters locally; likewise, in Iraq, ISIL 
recruited heavily from disgruntled Sunni Iraqis and prisoners released from Abu Ghraib Prison.71 
The maintenance of municipal service organizations, such as the Islamic Network for Public 
Services, by ISIL provided electricity and transportation greatly supported by the dams captured 
through water weaponizations, and was key to this recruitment.72 For this reason, acts of water 
weaponization are used, primarily the seizing of dams or use of water to control the local 
population, to track ISIL’s rise to power and fall to defeat.  
While other scholars have sought to identify acts of water weaponization to quantify the 
links between climate change and terrorism, the previous studies were finalized before the so-
called ‘defeat’ of the ISIL caliphate in March of 2019, which is of great importance in 
understanding how water resources have contributed to their strength. Additionally, the previous 
studies have been concerned with the exploration of ISIL’s water strategy rather than the strategy’s 
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deterioration of state sovereignty. My research aims to link environmental issues caused by climate 
change with terrorism by showing how the acquisition and manipulation of water resources 
illustrates the shifting power dynamic between the state and VNSAs.  
In order to do this, this paper explores the strategy of water weaponization by ISIL in the 
creation of their caliphate in order to show the power shift from the nation state to the terror group. 
To further explore this, this paper continues to analyze the decline of the caliphate with the loss of 
these key water resources and the eventual defeat of the caliphate to further show the power shift 
back to the nation state. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is used in this case study as their 
use of water weaponization is the strongest identified utilization of this strategy and their 
acquisition of territory to build a caliphate is transferable to tracking territorial power shifted to 
the VNSA group from the state and vice versa.  
A chronology of acts of water weaponization by ISIL throughout Iraq and Syria is produced 
from 2012, as they build their caliphate, eventually announcing in June 2014, through March 2019 
with the announcement of their defeat. The Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site, the Global 
Terrorism Database, news sources, local government and UN reports are employed to locate the 
acts of water weaponization. The Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site is a database tracking 
and categorizing events related to water and conflict. Their database is coded by region, date, 
category of conflict and includes sources confirming the event. The database is sorted through acts 
coded as ‘triggers’, ‘weapons’, and ‘casualty’; however, this was not utilized in my research. When 
the specific timeline of the event was unclear, this research utilized the Global Terrorism 
Database’s incident reports to narrow the specific date.  
This research corroborates these acts through newspapers and reports detailing the events. 
When possible, using both Western73 and regional news sources to detail the events in order to 
verify accurate depictions of the events and obtain both international and local accounts. Although 
multiple sources are used seeking to prevent bias and error, news media reports in conflict areas 
provide both crucial on-the-ground information and areas for uncertainty and misinformation. The 
UN and other international organizations publish reports periodically on the humanitarian situation 
and events in conflict zones, which are sometimes used to verify news reports.  
This chronology is then compared with the regional campaign tracker produced by the 
Institute for the Study of War in order to compare acts of water weaponization with territory 
controlled by the caliphate. The institute provides periodical publications of ISIS Sanctuary Maps 
detailing an assessment of the organization’s control throughout Iraq and Syria. Their publications 
begin in June of 2014 and the most recent was August 2019. To track the territory controlled by 
the ISIL, this research turns to their Syria Situation reports and other campaign tracking reports of 
Iraq and Syria which detail areas controlled by pro-regime forces, ISIL, SDF forces, Iraqi Security 
forces and reconciled opposition terrain.  
By connecting the acquisition and losses of these resources and acts of weaponization 
through the chronology with the tracking of territory controlled within the timeframe, this paper 
aims to show that the rise and decline of the ISIL caliphate in Iraq and Syria corresponds with the 
number of weaponization acts and areas attacked. In doing this, this paper hopes to provide a 
clearer view of how ISIL’s water weaponization coincides with their strength as a group. This 
correspondence will aid in solidifying the link between climate change and terrorism.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Preceding the proclamation of a caliphate by ISIL in June 2014, declaring the Islamic State, the 
insurgent group had already acquired territory and water resources. Figure 1. shows the territory 
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gained by ISIL up until just before the declaration of the caliphate. In a year-long offensive starting 
after the splintering of the group from Al Qaeda in 2013, ISIL sought territorial gains by fracturing 
Iraqi Security Forces starting from Mosul, Iraq.74 From Mosul, the group moved to weaken Iraqi 
government control toward Baghdad, expanding operations South of Mosul to Taji, Kirkuk and 
eventually to Baghdad aiming to lay the ground for an Islamic State.75 ISIL claimed Mosul from 
June 6-9, 2014 after dissolving the security forces and freeing over 3,000 prisoners from Abu 
Ghraib Prison.76 The Ar-Raqqa region of Northern Syria also provided a safe haven and training 
ground for ISIL seeking control of the Kurdish regions of Northern Syria.77  
 
Key. Marking of Weaponization Acts. 
 
   Key. 
 
- Act of water weaponization territorial acquisition 
 
- Loss of water resource previously held 
 
- Attempt of water weaponization (brief territorial acquisition) 
 
- Attempt of water weaponization (no territorial acquisition) 
  
 
Figure 1. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map June 10, 2014 
 
 
In Figure 1. their acquisition of Fallujah, Ba’ath, Tabqa and Tishrin dams are highlighted. 
ISIL captured the Tishrin Dam along the Euphrates in Manbij, Syria on November 16, 2012, their 
first dam seizure while the group was still fragmented and vying for power.78 Tishrin supplied 
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hydroelectricity.79 This attack led to a Syrian government air raid to regain territory and the dam; 
however, ISIL maintained control of the dam and surrounding areas.  
Several months after capturing Tishrin Dam, ISIL seized the neighboring Tabqa Dam in 
February 2013 and a year later, the Ba’ath Dam, both located in Ar-Raqqa, Syria (Figure 1.). This 
acquisition gave much of the countryside to the militant group while government forces struggled 
to retain the cities of Raqqa and Tabqa. ISIL eventually conquered the city of Raqqa in later 
January 2014.80 ISIL leaked that they had controlled the provision of water services after this 
acquisition by threatening the population with significant fines if the local population evaded the 
water taxes or tried to steal electricity.81 Their acquisition of Tabqa Dam, the largest dam in Syria, 
supplying five million people (including Aleppo) with water including irrigation for agricultural 
purposes and several towns with electricity, with a max hydropower capacity of 824 megawatts, 
greatly strengthened their security threat.82 The control over this Dam gave them power over this 
population. The Tabqa Dam is also strategic due to its location on Lake Assad and has been Syria’s 
main source of electricity, in the past making Syria self-sufficient in power generation.83 The 
Ba’ath dam provides less hydropower, a max capacity of 81 megawatts, but supplies 60% of 




Table 2. Chronology of Water Weaponization by the ISIL within Iraq and Syria  
Date Location Description 
November 26, 2012 Manbij, Syria ISIL rebels85 capture Tishrin 
Dam 
February 11, 2012 Raqqa, Syria ISIL rebels capture Tabqa 
Dam 
February, 2013 Raqqa, Syria ISIL rebels capture Ba’ath 
Dam 
January, 2014 Aleppo, Syria ISIL seizes Aleppo Water 
Pumping Station 
April 11, 2014 Nuaimiya, Iraq ISIL rebels capture Fallujah 
Dam 
June, 2014 Qaraqosh, Iraq ISIL blocks water pipes in 
Qaraqosh 
June 25, 2014 Haditha, Iraq ISIL troops advance toward 
Haditha Dam 
August 7, 2014 Mosul, Iraq ISIL captures Mosul Dam 
August 18, 2014 Mosul, Iraq Kurdish troops regain control 
of Mosul Dam 
December, 2014 Salahaddin, Syria ISIL contaminates drinking 
water in Salahaddin 
Governorate 
January, 2015 Mosul, Iraq ISIL attacks Mosul Dam 
April, 2015 Samarra, Iraq ISIL attacks Samarra Dam 
June, 2015 Ramadi, Iraq ISIL shuts off water flows 
below the Ramadi Dam 
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December 23, 2015 Manbij, Syria Syrian Democratic Forces 
regain control of Tishrin Dam 
June 13, 2016 Fallujah, Iraq Iraqi forces regain control of 
Fallujah Dam 
November 29, 2016 Mosul, Iraq ISIL destroys water pipeline 
in Mosul 
December, 2016 Ramadi, Iraq Iraqi officials announce they 
have full control of Ramadi 
February, 2017 Aleppo, Syria ISIL floods fields in Aleppo to 
stop the Syrian Army 
March, 2017 Aleppo, Syria Syrian Regime forces regain 
water pumping station in 
Aleppo 
March-May 2017 Raqqa, Syria US and Syrian forces fight 
ISIL controlling Tabqa Dam 
June, 2017 Raqqa, Syria Syrian Democratic Forces 
Seize Ba’ath Dam 
June, 2018 Raqqa, Syria Syrian Government 
announces reoperation of 
Tabqa and Tishrin Dams 
In January 2014, ISIL rebels seized one of the main water-pumping stations in Aleppo, 
Syria leading to the local population being without water for two months (Figure 1.).86 This site 
had previously been captured by opposition forces in February 2013.87 Their final acquisition 
before the caliphate was the Fallujah Dam in Nuaimiya, Iraq on April 11, 2014 (Figure 1.) which 
helps to distribute water from the Euphrates River as well as provide water for a number of 
irrigation projects throughout the Anbar province.88 ISIL captured Nuaimiya in February and 
closed the gates to the dam one week before (approximately week of April 4) which reduced water 
flow to the rest of Iraq’s Southern provinces.89 Insurgents reopened five gates on April 10 fearing 
that the dam would flood their stronghold in Fallujah (Reuters, April 11, 2014). Iraqi officials 
stated that previous flooding from the dam has already caused families to flee and had prevented 
security troops from retaliating against ISIL.90 Decline of water levels from the dam closure also 
resulted in power outages (decrease from 170 megawatts to 90 megawatts) in Baghdad which 
relied on steam-powered generators.91 By closing the floodgates, they diverted water over an 
irrigation channel, flooding land up to 100 km away, including the city of Abu Ghraib, under up 
to four meters of water.92 More than 10,000 houses and 200 square kilometers of fertile farmland, 
including the annual harvest, were destroyed between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib.93 Over 60,000 
residents in the area were displaced after losing their livelihood to the flood.94 In destroying homes, 
agricultural fields and livelihood, the local population is forced to succumb to the insurgent groups’ 




Figure 2. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map October 30, 2014 
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Institute for the Study of War (2015, August 3). 
 
 In June 2014, following the declaration of the caliphate, ISIL obstructed water pipes to the 
predominantly Christian town of Qaraqosh, Iraq (Figure 2.).95 They took over agricultural lands 
displacing close to 50,000 inhabitants pushing them to arrive in search of safety, food and water 
in Erbil.96 This action followed ISIL’s seizure of the city of Mosul on June 10, 2014 which is 
nearby. The seizure of Mosul attached ISIL’s southern Dier ez-Zour and Anbar system, which was 
the primary goal throughout July.97 ISIL also maintained vast control of territory in Northeast Syria 
in the Ar-Raqqa province and surrounding Aleppo continuing to hold Tishrin, Ba’ath and Tabqa 
dams as well as the Aleppo Pumping Station (Figure 2.).  
Later in June, Iraqi security officials reported that ISIL troops were advancing on the 
Haditha Dam (Figure 2.).98 More than 2,000 Iraqi troops were deployed to the area to protect the 
dam, prepared to open the floodgates if ISIL reached the dam which would cause flooding of the 
town and villages and potential harm to the locals.99 Due to its attachment to Lake Qadisiyah, 
which could be a potential weapon of mass destruction, US rangers seized Haditha Dam during 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein’s forces from destroying it and causing an 
enormous flood.100 ISIL was unable to seize the dam due to Iraqi presence; however, this would 
have been a major gain if they had, as it supplied more than 30% of Iraq’s energy, particularly to 
the city of Baghdad.101  
ISIL captured the key facility of Mosul Dam (Figure 2.) on August 7, 2014 prompting swift 
airstrikes by the Iraqi government, Kurdish and US starting on August 11.102 The head of the 
Kurdistan region’s presidency office noted that ISIL had transitioned from a terrorist organization 
to a terrorist state.103 The dam can produce 1010 megawatts of electricity, 75% of Iraq’s energy 
production capability and holds back 12 billion cubic meters of water which are crucial for the 
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irrigation of local agriculture of the Nineveh province.104 It is estimated that a catastrophic failure 
of Mosul dam could result in a flood wave of 20 meters toward the city of Mosul.105 ISIL’s featured 
their capture in their propaganda campaign and the group placed an Islamic State flag on top of 
the dam declaring their victory shown in Figure 3. The Iraqi government and Kurdish forces 
announced that they have fully regained control of Mosul Dam with the help of US airstrikes on 
August 18, 2014 (Figure 2.).106 US airstrikes commenced on August 8 following ISIL’s capture.107 
These were the first US operations in Iraq since 2011 when they pulled out of the war in Iraq and 
prompted further European involvement against the insurgent group.108  
 
Figure 3. ISIL Propaganda featuring Mosul Dam. 
 
Photos retrieved from UN Security Council CTED Trends Report March 2017 
 
September and October 2014 marked ISIL’s consolidation of control over the Anbar 
province of Iraq, specifically the midpoint of Hit between Ramadi and Haditha.109 This 
corresponded with ISIL’s quest for the Haditha Dam (Figure 2.). The ‘Southwestern Baghdad 
Belts’ had been an ISIL stronghold including Jurf al-Sakhar, Farisiyah, Fadhiliyah, Abu Ghraib, 
and Amiriyat al-Fallujah; however, Iraqi Security forces were struggling to maintain control of 
Amiriyat al-Fallujah which was crucial for their strength.110 Their stronghold in Mosul fell before 
the June attack on Mosul dam, but it is noted that this could have been in order to preserve the 
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Figure 4. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map December 8, 2016 
 
 
Institute for the Study of War (2016, December 6). 
 
In October 2014, ISIL captured the city of Hit between Ramadi and Haditha, as previously 
targeted, and sought to take Ramadi.112 In December 2014, ISIL conducted simultaneous attacks 
on Iraqi Security Forces in Haditha and Ramadi in their widespread ground offensive to capture 
Ramadi.113 In December 2014, the UN reported that ISIL had intentionally contaminated drinking 
water with crude oil in the Governorate of Salahaddin as well as in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa 
(Figure 4.).114 During this time, Kurdish SDF forces pushed ISIL’s presence to the periphery of 
Raqqa; however, ISIL expanded greatly in the Hasaka province and surrounding Damascus in 
Syria near where the Salahaddin contamination took place.115 ISIL also saw losses in Mosul in 
January 2015 and launched another attack on Mosul Dam (Figure 4.); however, the militant group 
was not able to capture the dam.116 Peshmerga soldiers and Sunni tribal groups near Mosul 
prevented this attack leading ISIL to declare new governorates in nearby Jazeera and Zaab in a 
defensive mobilization around Mosul.117  
Iraqi forces conducted a major offensive to take back areas around Tikrit and Baiji from 
November 2014 through March 2015.118 ISIL took partial control of the Samarra dam (also known 
as Al-Thirthar dam) in Samarra, Iraq in late April 2015 (Figure 4.).119 Iraqi forces announced an 
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increased offensive to take back the Anbar province, but this attack majorly decreased their 
progress.120  
ISIL seized Ramadi dam (Figure 4.) in May of 2015 and weaponized this water by cutting 
off pro-government towns downstream on the Euphrates River.121 This followed ISIL’s conquest 
of Ramadi which finally fell on May 27, 2015 after many months of ground attacks against Iraqi 
forces (Martin, 2015). The militants manipulated the dam by only opening two or three of the 
dam’s gates per day rather than the twenty-six possible.122 This lowered the depth of the river 
allowing ISIL soldiers to cross and strike pro-government towns of Husaybah and Khalidiyah, 
most importantly located near the Habbaniya military base.123 Additionally, there were threats to 
cut off drinking and irrigation water to the local population reportedly causing thousands to go 
without drinking water in the height of the summer heat.124 800 Iraqi federal forces were deployed 
to combat ISIL following a major Iraqi government operation tasked to take back the Anbar 
province, of which Ramadi is the capital.125 There were reports of families fleeing the militants’ 
control; however, the reports vary from dozens to 300 families.126  
In September of 2015, Russia began its direct intervention in Syria enabling the Syrian 
regime to mount renewed offensives against the caliphate.127 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
and proxy forces initiated a prolonged offensive on the city of Aleppo.128 US backed SDF forces 
also made major gains along the Syria-Iraq border in Al-Hawl and Sinjar provinces.129 The SDF 
were also advancing toward the Southern Hasaka province seeking to liberate areas of the Ar-
Raqqa province.130 On December 23, 2015 in this SDF offensive to liberate ISIL controlled towns 
along the Euphrates River, the forces regained control of the Tishrin Dam (Figure 4.).131  
ISIL continued to lose terrain in Iraq and Syria throughout the early months of 2016. Iraqi 
Security Forces reseized the city of Hit in the Anbar Province on April 14 as part of continual 
operations to secure the Euphrates River Valley.132 In May, ISIL lost territory in Iraq but claimed 
an attack on Wilayat Sahel, on the Northwestern coast of Syria, located in regime territory.133 ISIL 
combatants initiated complex suicide attacks in deep regime territory in Tartus City and Jableh on 
May 23, 2016 and indicated they were escalating assaults against Alawite communities on the 
coast of Syria in order to aggravate existing sectarian tensions during the month of Ramadan.134 
On June 13, 2016 Iraqi forces regained control of the nearby Fallujah dam (Figure 4.), 
which ISIL took in early 2014, following an Iraqi quest to liberate the city of Fallujah on May 
23.135 ISIL also capitulated the city of Manbij and the town of Al-Rai in Northern Aleppo Province 
in a chain of victories for the US-backed anti-ISIL coalition in July.136 Simultaneously, the Iraqi 
Security Forces sustained conditions for future operations to retake Mosul.137 These areas under 
ISIL control in Mosul, Raqqa and Al-Bab were weakened in October by increasingly strong anti-
ISIL operations.138 In retaliation to the encroaching Iraqi forces, on November 29, 2016 more than 
650,000 Iraqis were without water in Mosul after ISIL struck one of the three major water pipelines 
(Figure 4.).139 It was reported that the militant group cut electricity to the water stations feeding 
neighborhoods where Iraqi troops were advancing in the operations by Iraqi Security forces to 




Figure 5. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map August 19, 2019 
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Institute for the Study of War (2019, October 12). 
 
In late December 2016, Iraqi officials announced that they had control over Ramadi Dam 
and the surrounding town (Figure 5.).141 ISIL initiated offensives in January 2017 against the 
Syrian regime in Deir ez-Zour, the Eastern Homs province, and the Eastern Damascus province, 
capitalizing on the regime’s focus on Aleppo and aiming to offset or redirect regime operations 
near Al-Bab.142 ISIL flooded villages in Deir Hafer Plain in East Aleppo, Syria (Figure 5.) in 
response to a raid by the Syrian Arab Army.143 The militant group pumped water from Assad Lake 
into Al-Jar Channel.144 This advancement by the Syrian Army put them within the ISIL stronghold 
of Deir Hafer for the first time since the creation of the caliphate.145 Regime forces began to chip 
away at ISIL’s territorial gains in Homs province in mid-February and ISIL capitulated additional 
terrain in Mosul, Iraq to the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017.146  
ISIL suffered territorial losses in Iraq and Syria between February 27 and March 9, 2017.147 
Pro-regime forces reseized Palmyra, Syria with reinforcements from Iranian, Russian, and 
Lebanese Hezbollah forces on March 2.148 Pro-regime forces acquired additional towns from ISIL 
in the Northeast Aleppo province between March 7 and March 9.149 Syrian regime forces 
recaptured the key water pumping station in Aleppo, Syria (Figure 5.) after inhabitants had been 
without water for two months since ISIL had cut the pipeline.150 ISIL seized the facility in January, 
2014 (Figure 5.).151  
In May 2017, US-backed forces continued to advance in major ISIL strongholds in Mosul, 
Iraq and Raqqa, Syria.152 Iraqi Security forced encircled the city of Mosul and US-backed SDF 
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forces captured the city of Tabqa.153 The Syrian Democratic Forces and US troops launched an 
offensive in March against ISIL holding Tabqa Dam, a key source of hydroelectricity for the 
caliphate.154 On May 10, 2017 reports indicated that drone footage showed the dam completely 
under SDF control (Figure 5.).155 Both Tabqa and Tishrin Dams were re-operational under the 
Syrian government in June 2018 (Figure 5.).156 NATO leaders also formally negotiated a 
partnership in the Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria during the NATO Summit on May 25 in 
Brussels, announcing that NATO will increase its "airspace management" and aerial refueling 
mission for coalition aircraft and expand its deployment of special forces teams to train local ally 
forces.157 As ISIL within Iraq had largely been defeated, regional actors continued to vie for 
control of post-ISIL Iraqi reconstruction.158  
In June of 2017, US-backed SDF forces regained control of the last dam under ISIL control, 
the Ba’ath Dam (Figure 5.).159 This came within the SDF’s major offensive to take back Raqqa, 
which they achieved in October of that year.160 In September, Syrian pro-regime forces continued 
to attack Deir ez-Zor province with the support of heavy bombardment by the US and Russia and 
also launched offensives to clear out the Iraq-Syrian border.161 This offensive from Deir ez-Zor 
continued down the Euphrates river to continue liberating towns.162 Additionally, the US Anti-
ISIS coalition withdrew from its outpost on the Syrian-Iraqi border near Homs as part of a de-
confliction agreement.163 In July 2017, a de-escalation zone in Southern Syria was brokered by the 
US, Russia and Jordan.164 On October 20, the SDF declared victory over ISIL in the city of Raqqa, 
Syria.165  
In early 2018, Israel announced its support for the new opposition offensive against ISIL 
in Syria entitled “Battle of Conquerors” and reportedly contributed cross border shelling from the 
Golan Heights.166 The coalitions continued offensives against ISIL in the Deir ez-Zor province of 
Syria.167 In May of 2018, Syrian pro-regime forces announced the complete control of Damascus 
after the evacuation of the last remaining pocket in the capital city.168 Additionally, the US-led 
coalition launched Operation Roundup in order to “destroy IS” in Eastern Syria.169 In December 
of 2019, President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of troops from Syria and in January, 
US troops were spotted removing military equipment from Northern Syria.170 This movement 
came after US troops prepared to clear the final pocket of ISIL held territory in the Deir ez-Zor 
province of Syria.171 ISIL lost its last territorial zone in Syria on March 23, 2019 after it was seized 
by SDF forces.172 
Looking forward after the ‘defeat’ of the caliphate, it was estimated that ISIL still had over 
30,000 fighters located within Iraq and Syria in August 2018 based on a report by a defense 
intelligence agency.173 After the widely successful offensives, it was presumed that ISIL 
deliberately pulled back, relocating the majority of combatants and their families from Mosul, 
Raqqa, and other prominent cities into new and previously known support zones in Iraq and 
Syria.174 ISIL forces are now scattered across Iraq and Syria and are still an existing security 
threat.175 ISIL also preserved their global finance network which enabled their ability to transition 
back to an insurgency, additionally, retaining ample weaponry and other resources in alleged 
tunnel systems and other support mechanisms in order to equip its revived insurgent force in the 
future.176 On May 31, 2019, ISIL declared the start of a new global campaign called the ‘Battle of 
Attrition’ instructing their followers to seize terrain temporarily as a way to erode their 
opponents.177 ISIL has also made great strides in its ability to campaign both in Iraq and Syria and 
abroad which enables it new opportunities.178 A successful reestablishment of a physical caliphate 
in Iraq and Syria could yield new surges of ISIL attacks in Europe and give the opportunity for 
legitimization of ISIL’s inevitable long-term victory narrative.179 
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Conclusion 
This paper explored the capacity of climate change to shift the power dynamic between nation-
states and violent non-state actors within their borders. The water weaponization of ISIL in Iraq 
and Syria shows the ability of manipulating water resources in a water scarce and politically 
unstable environment to strengthen the role of violent non-state actors. Fourteen acts of water 
weaponization were identified and chronologized along with any subsequent state actions to 
reconcile these water resources. These acts of water weaponization were mapped in order to 
correlate ISIL’s use of water as a weapon with the acquisition and loss of territory within their 
caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Analysis of these acts showed a swell of weaponization acts before the 
establishment of the caliphate and during its territorial strength from 2012 through 2015 and the 
demise of both the frequency of weaponization acts and the territory held by the caliphate from 
then until 2019.  
These findings show a link between the effects of climate change and the increased 
opportunity for violent non-state actors through the weakening of the nation-state. Furthermore, 
this case shows the vulnerability of states to VNSAs while under environmental and political 
stress. Although the caliphate was ‘defeated’, ISIL remains a continued security threat and the 
strategy of water weaponization could be used to reestablish territorial control over other water 
scarce regions. Similar tactics have been seen throughout Africa, Southeast Asia and other areas 
within the Middle East, and this strategy could become widespread as climate change impacts 
increase. 
The offensives to take back resources acquired by ISIL through water weaponization were 
enabled by the involvement of outside international actors including the US, Russia, NATO, Israel 
and Iran who provided military-training, funding and weaponry to strengthen on the ground forces 
in Iraq and Syria. Following the demise of the caliphate, international support withdrew and 
coincided with a shift towards controlling the reconstruction of post-ISIL Iraq and Syria. The 
success of the reconstruction and strengthening of these states will become a key predictor in 
ISIL’s potential resurgence in the region. Additionally, as climate change effects increase, this 
strategy could become widespread and used by other groups taking the lead of ISIL. The 
strengthening of both central governance and authority over water infrastructure is vital for future 
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